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Abstract
Critiques of the concept of key success factors have raised objections both conceptually and
methodologically. From the latter perspective, common research practice is criticized for ne-
glecting the influence of firm-specific, unobservable variables (e.g., management skills). To
control for these effects a structural equation approach (“LISREL”) to the analysis of panel
data is proposed. In an empirical study based on the PIMS annual data base the influence of
unobservables on the direct and indirect effects of product quality on profitability is exam-
ined. It is shown, how a step by step extension of a basic simultaneous equation model sheds
some light on the role unobservable variables play. Even after controlling for persistent un-
observable effects product quality and market share remain significant determinants of prof-
itability.
1. Introduction
Research in strategic management mainly focuses on explaining performance differences between
companies. Slightly exaggerated, the essence of strategy research has even been characterized as
the “hunt for success factors” (Ghemawat, 1991, p. 3). The normative implications of this research
are, that firms should pursue strategies which lead to the development or acquisition of those re-
sources or competencies identified as key success factors in the firm's environment. Various man-
agement prescriptions formulated by consultants and academics alike are related to strategies based
for example on market share, quality management, customer satisfaction or market orientation as
basic determinants of business success.
Although key success factors can be identified in a deductive way (Sousa de Vasconcellos e Sá and
Hambrick, 1989) or by doing case studies (e.g., Peters and Waterman, 1982), typically large-scale,
multi-industry samples are examined in a cross-sectional style (e.g., Capon, Farley, and Hoenig,
1990). The PIMS program (Buzzell and Gale, 1987) and its vast amount of subsequent studies are
exemplary for this type of research. In general, great correspondence exists between empirical re-
search in the classical industrial organisation (IO) tradition and strategy-oriented business studies.
The latter have not only borrowed from the methodological toolbox developed in IO research, also
their basic design follows closely its structure-conduct-performance paradigm. But, whereas classi-
3cal IO mainly concentrated on the structure component (conduct was only implicit), business-ori-
ented studies naturally are more interested in strategic actions and their performance implications
(Porter, 1981).
However, the approach to base the development of firm strategies on empirically identified key
success factors has received both conceptual and methodological criticism (Rumelt, Schendel, and
Teece, 1991; Ghemawat, 1991; Camerer and Fahey, 1988; Jacobson, 1992). Some groups of man-
agement researchers and economists even totally dismiss the idea of key success factors. Assuming
that “no general rule for riches” (Rumelt, Schendel, and Teece, 1991, p. 11) - a rule which follows
from the equilibrium assumption routinely invoked by economic theory - exists, these researchers
doubt that firms can gain supranormal profits by following prescriptions widely known among
competing firms. If firms do not face difficulties to implement such strategies than none of them
should gain a sustainable competitive advantage - any above average return would be competed
away immediately (Barney, 1986).
The “no general rule for riches” appears as a compelling argument against the concept of success
factors. So far, this position is to a large extent unchallenged and the great majority of researchers
investigating strategy-performance relationships even tends to ignore this critique. Only a few aca-
demics have made efforts towards a rebuttal. Boulding and Staelin (1993, 1995) develop a concep-
tual framework which helps to determine the conditions under which general strategic prescriptions
(e.g., gaining market share, R&D expenditures) allow firms to sustain supranormal returns. Other
researchers like Grunert and Ellegaard (1993) suppose that key success factors are sufficiently sta-
ble at least for a medium-range period of time. They regard the concreteness of a key success factor
in terms of the actions necessary to develop the required resources as a major determinant of the
time-span by which this factor is able to explain performance differences. In a similar way
Mosakowski (1998) argues that the connection between managerial prescriptions and firm per-
formance is not deterministic but to a certain extent stochastic. Proposed key success factors in the
first place convey information of a “know what” but not of a “know how” type. Strategic decisions
and their implementations based on the same general prescriptions might therefore lead to different
firm-specific resources and competencies and thus to different performance levels. Although “rules
for riches” at best are transitory, general “rules of chances for riches” (Mosakowski, 1998, p. 1171)
may persist over time. From that point of view, research on key success factors can support compa-
nies in improving their business performance.
The economic concept of equilibrium also raises questions about the interpretation of relationships
between certain strategic actions and business performance revealed in empirical studies (Camerer,
1985; Wensley, 1982). Driving this concept to the extreme, if firms base their decisions on rational
expectations (Muth, 1961) incorporating all relevant economic knowledge including even the per-
formance implications of the strategy under study, than all investments into the required resources
4should be properly priced. In this case, no positive effects of, for example, advertising expenditures
or market share gains on profits should emerge in a correctly specified model. If one nevertheless
finds a positive effect, two basic interpretations are possible. First, one might dismiss the equilib-
rium assumption and might instead assume that indeed novel knowledge on key success factors has
been revealed, a perspective which most researchers engaged in strategy-performance studies
would agree with (e.g., Biggadike, 1979). Second, if one is reluctant to suppose that the decision
makers were ignorant about the managerial prescription, the question rises what else might be re-
sponsible for the performance differences. Here, many possible causes have been put forward, for
example superior management quality, private information, a privileged resource position or simply
“luck” (e.g., Rumelt, Schendel, and Teece, 1991; Jacobson, 1992). Because these phenomena are to
a large extent difficult to measure or even unobservable they have been widely neglected in empiri-
cal studies (e.g., Buzzell and Gale, 1987).
In the end, the degree to which decision makers understand the “true” causes of success in their
business environment remains largely an empirical question (Rumelt, Schendel and Teece, 1991).
This leads to the conclusion that especially those phenomena which are unobservable, like private
information or firm specific “invisible assets” (Itami and Roehl, 1987) have to be taken into ac-
count when the effect of observed strategic factors is estimated (Jacobson, 1990, 1992).
Fundamental to the issue of controlling for unobservables in empirical studies is the application of
an appropriate methodology. Different methods have been proposed which in general have pro-
duced different results using the same data (Rumelt and Wensley, 1980; Jacobson and Aaker, 1985;
Jacobson, 1988, Jacobson, 1990; Boulding, 1990; Boulding and Staelin, 1990, 1993; Ailawadi,
Farris, and Parry, 1999). The substantial interpretations therefore are to a large extent method-de-
pendent. A related problem concerns the distinction between short-term and long-term effects of
strategic success factors. For example, the main intension of the PIMS architects has been to ex-
plain “strategic”, typically long-run performance differences between strategic business units oper-
ating in different industries (Buzzell and Gale, 1987; Buzzell this issue; see also Ailawadi, Farris,
and Parry, 1993). In contrast, the empirical studies cited above make use of the panel character of
the PIMS annual data base to control for the influence of unobservable variables, but thereby ex-
plain rather short-term changes of business performance (e.g., Buzzell and Gale, 1987; Buzzell, this
issue).
From a managerial perspective, another problem is that unobservable variables have been sub-
sumed under rather broad categories like “management quality” or “luck”, which is of no particular
help for management when it comes to strategy development. Management research in general is
interested in managerial and observable impact factors. As such, for decades a theoretical basis
using concepts from the IO-approach seemed most appropriate to guide management decisions.
5However, the debate about unobservable influences also led to the adoption of new paradigms in
strategy research.
In the last decade, strategic management has seen the rapid diffusion of the resource-based view of
the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984). Based on the fundamental assumption that firms differ (at least to
some extent) in their resource endowments, strict advocates of this theory regard firm-specific re-
sources and competencies as the fundamental causes of sustained competitive advantage (e.g.,
Barney, 1991; Grant, 1991; Peteraf, 1993, Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997). Because not every re-
source is strategically relevant, general characteristics have been developed which qualify a re-
source (or a team of resources) as the basis for competitive advantage (e.g., Barney, 1991; Peteraf,
1993). Such resources should be valuable and rare and not easily be transferred, imitated or substi-
tuted.
If we accept this perspective, the resource-based view offers a rich theoretical foundation for the
explanation of - in general unobservable - firm specific factors of success. As such the approach
can be seen as an alternative or at least as a supplement to the classical, IO based approaches to
explain success even if an important problem until now is insufficiently solved: The resource-based
view lacks valid operationalizations of most of its basic concepts (e.g., competencies). Efforts to
measure these variables might even destroy their capability to give firms a competitive advantage
(Godfrey and Hill, 1995). In fact, the problems identified with the empirical search for observed
causes of performance differences also apply to many cross-sectional resource-based studies (Priem
and Butler 2001; Rouse and Dällenbach, 1999).
To sum up the discussion, a methodology is required which at least controls for unobservable ef-
fects, estimates the impact of controllable and manageable input variables and takes into account
strategic planning purposes (Jacobson, 1990). Here the paper offers a methodology based on a
structural equation approach to the estimation of econometric panel models. We also take into ac-
count the objections mentioned above regarding previous methods for controlling unobservables.
The approach starts with a cross-sectional model for pooled data, which reflects the long-term
character of strategic variables. This model is extended stepwise to control for unobservable vari-
ables which can be distinguished according to their behaviour over time. To show the capabilities
of this methodology, a simultaneous equation model of four variables is specified using key hy-
potheses on the impact of product quality on profitability from the PIMS research (see Phillips,
Chang, and Buzzell, 1983; Jacobson, 1988; Hildebrandt and Annacker, 1996).
The remaining parts of the paper are organized as follows. First, we provide a brief state of the art
and assessment of different methods to control for unobservable variables in business performance
models. Second, we propose a structural equation approach to pooled time-series cross-sectional
data in order to control for unobservable variables. With help of a concrete model of the impact of
6product quality on profitability it will be shown, how different types of unobservables can be taken
into account by gradually extending a simple baseline model. Third, the methodology is applied to
three samples from the PIMS data base, where the specified models are estimated using LISREL.
Fourth, we will discuss the implications of our study.
2. Methods to control for unobservable variables
In order to control the influence of unobservable variables on the observed relationships between
proposed key drivers of success and measures of firm performance, different methods can be used.
An obvious approach would be to operationalize selected unobservable variables (e.g., market ori-
entation) in terms of multiple observed indicators (e.g., Jaworski and Kohli, 1993; Narver and
Slater, 1990) and to use regression models or structural equation models with latent variables (e.g.,
Bollen, 1989) to estimate their impact on the directly observed variables in the model. However,
besides the difficulties to measure complex firm-specific unobservables like corporate culture or
core competencies, for pragmatic reasons this approach is restricted to only a few variables. Alter-
natively, data envelopment analysis (Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes, 1978) can be deployed to ob-
tain proxy variables for managerial efficiency in different functional areas (see for example Murthi,
Srinivasan, and Kalyanaram, 1996). It still remains an open question to what extent this method
captures all relevant invisible assets.
A more comprehensive approach rests on the availability of panel data and has already been ap-
plied in previous studies analyzing business performance (e.g., Jacobson, 1990; Boulding and
Staelin, 1990, 1993, 1995; Ailawadi, Farris, and Parry, 1999). The large number of unobserved as
well as truly unobservable variables (Griliches, 1974) which potentially are correlated with both the
observed strategic factors and firm performance is classified according to the temporal characteris-
tics of their influence. Customarily, three types of variables are distinguished and represented by a
specific component of an additive error term itu :
ittiiit uu erm ++= - 1, . (1)
(1) Firm-specific variables which have a stable effect over the period of analysis, for example cor-
porate culture or management quality, are taken into account by the time-invariant variable im . (2)
Other variables whose influence is likewise persistent but dissipating over time (e.g., product inno-
vations or technological know how), are captured by the term 1, -tiur  if a first-order autoregressive
(AR1) process as the most parsimonious representation is supposed. (3) Finally, temporary sto-
chastic shocks (e.g., “luck”) whose effects last only one period (e.g., one year) are modelled by the
serially uncorrelated stochastic disturbance ite .
7To control simultaneously for the different types of unobservable effects, for example in a linear,
single-equation regression
ititit uxy += 'b , (2)
where itx  is a (K ·  1) vector of exogenous variables and b  a (K ·  1) vector of regression
parameters, the following procedure (Boulding and Staelin, 1993) has been proposed. First, a r -
transformation followed by taking first differences eliminates both the serially correlated effects
1,
-tiur  and the time-invariant variables im . Let 1,: --=D tiitit xxx , this leads to the following
autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model:
ittiittiit xxyy ebbr D+D+D+D=D -- 1,211, , (3)
where the first-order autocorrelation model imposes the restriction 12 r bb -= . Second, to control
for a possible contemporaneous correlation between the moving-average error term iteD  and the
explanatory variables, values lagged at least two periods (levels or differences) can be used as in-
struments in a 2SLS estimation of equation (3).
Although formally the described approach represents a valid method to control for unobservable
variables, it should be pointed out, that the required transformations fundamentally alter the model
and its intepretation. As can be seen from equation (3), year-to-year changes of strategic factors are
related to year-to-year changes in performance (e.g., ROI). If one assumes that long-term and short-
term effects differ, this means that by using difference data only short-term effects of strategic fac-
tors are examined. Only in this context stochastic effects might play an important role in the rela-
tionships between key factors of success and firm performance. If the researcher is instead con-
cerned with the strategic and therefore long-term implications of key success factors, temporary
stochastic shocks might be neglected. From this perspective it seems justified to focus on the con-
trol of time-invariant and serially correlated unobservable effects.
Meanwhile a large body of econometric literature (e.g., Hsiao, 1986; Baltagi, 1995) exists to help
researchers in specifying panel models and major statistical software packages (e.g., SAS) provide
special procedures for the estimation of such models. Alternatively, a structural equation approach
(“LISREL”), whose application in econometric panel studies has already been proposed in the late
seventies (Jöreskog, 1978), can be used. This approach, however, has largely been ignored in eco-
nomics and business research (for an exception see Lillard and Willis, 1978; Hildebrandt and
Annacker, 1996) although it offers much greater flexibility in the specification of panel models,
including the integration of measurement models. We will now present how LISREL (Jöreskog and
Sörbom, 1996) can be specified to control for the biasing influence of different types of unobserved
variables in a structural equation model.
83. The Conceptual Model and Extensions Controlling for Unobservables
3.1 Baseline Model
In order to assess the impact of unobservable or simply unobserved variables on the relationships
between perceived product quality, profitability and the intervening variables market share and
direct cost we start with a baseline model (BM) in which their influence is completely ignored. In
this cross-sectional model return on investment ( ROI ) is specified as a function of the strategic
variables product quality ( QUA ) and market share (MS) as well as relative direct cost (COST).
Direct cost are determined by product quality and also by market share, which in turn is driven by
product quality. For this simultaneous equation model we assume that the disturbances are uncor-
related both over time and across equations (note that specifying free contemporaneous correlations
between the disturbances would make the model underidentified):
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To control for the persistent effects attributable to unobservables, this baseline model is gradually
extended by incorporating different error components.
3.2 Model Extensions
3.2.1 Controlling for time-invariant effects
As a first step, we exclusively control for unobserved persistent characteristics of the SBUs hy-
pothesized to be invariant over time (e.g., management quality or customer-oriented culture). Al-
though one might expect that product quality is correlated with these individual effects we start
with a random effects model (RE) under the assumption of no such correlation. The random indi-
vidual effects gim  for each equation ( )3,...,1 =gg  are represented in the LISREL model by addi-
tional latent variables for which no measurement relations exist (see Jöreskog, 1978). In contrast to
the time-varying disturbances gite  we assume that these effects are correlated with each other.
9As is well known from the panel data literature, the consistency of the model parameters in the RE
model hinges on the validity of the assumption that the exogenous variables are indeed uncorrelated
with the individual effects. If the latter is not the case, a fixed-effects specification is typically
choosen (e.g., Hsiao, 1986). A convenient way followed predominantly in previous studies on
business performance is to eliminate these persistent effects by taking first differences of the data
(e.g., Boulding and Staelin, 1990; Ailawadi, Farris, and Parry, 1999). As an alternative specifica-
tion which controls for a possible correlation between individual effects and exogenous variables
we propose a modified random effects model, hereafter referred to as the RECEV (random effects
correlated with exogenous variables) model. Following Mundlak (1978), we assume that the condi-
tional expectation of the random effects ( )itgi xE m  can be approximated by a linear reduced form:
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g
Ngi vsw . Augmenting the RE model by the reduced form equations for the individ-
ual effects, this model can be written as follows:
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The RECEV model has several advantages over the first difference (FD) model. In contrast to the
FD model time-invariant observed variables can be included. In addition, the model allows a flexi-
ble specification of correlations between the individual effects and selected exogenous variables.
Because the RE model is nested in the RECEV model, hypotheses about correlations between the
individual effects and all or specific exogenous variables can be easily tested by 2c  difference
tests. To test these hypotheses for the FD model the Hausman test has to be used, which relies on
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the differences in the parameter estimates between the random and the fixed effects specification
(Hausman, 1978).
3.2.2 Controlling for autoregressive effects
As a further extension, we assume that besides the time-invariant individual effects serially corre-
lated unobserved variables are present and correlated with the explanatory variables. The latter ef-
fects can be eliminated by r -differencing the data (e.g., Boulding and Staelin, 1993, 1995). This
leads to the following autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) specification of the simultaneous
equation model:
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The serial correlation hypothesis imposes non-linear restrictions on the coefficients for the lagged
explanatory variables (e.g., 112 brb -=  or 112 grg -= ), since it is assumed that the explanatory
variables only have a current effect on the dependent variables. The autoregressive effects of the
lagged dependent variables in each equation therefore exclusively reflect the influence of serially
correlated unobserved variables which influence business performance and possibly also the ex-
planatory variables. Because the autocorrelation model with individual effects (hereafter noted as
AR1-RECEV) is nested in the unrestricted ARDL model (7), 2c difference tests (likelihood ratio
tests) can be used to examine if the non-linear restrictions of this model hold.
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A rival hypothesis states that the explanatory variables influence unobserved variables, for example
“goodwill”, which in turn affect the dependent variables, for example profitability. In this state de-
pendence model the indirect, lagged influence of strategic factors like product quality via some
unobserved state variables is reflected in the autoregression coefficient of the lagged dependent
variable, which is in sharp contrast to its interpretation in the autocorrelation model. This gives rise
to the restriction that the coefficient for the lagged explanatory variable is zero in the ARDL model
(7) (for a discussion of both the serial correlation and the state dependence model see Jacobson,
1990; Ailawadi, Farris, and Parry, 1993).
4. Empirical Study
4.1 Data
The performance of the LISREL approach to control for unobservables is demonstrated in an em-
pirical analysis based on the PIMS SPIYR annual database. Data for those strategic business units
(SBU) have been sampled which at least provide information for six consecutive years. This results
in a pooled sample of 1141 SBU. In order to control for differences which can be attributed to the
industry type a strategic business unit belongs to, we analyse the following three samples (service
and distribution businesses are excluded from the analysis because of small sample size):
• (other) industrial goods ( 608=N )
• capital goods ( 187=N )
• consumer goods ( 311=N )
The sample “other industrial goods” consists of business units which manufacture raw and semi-
finished materials, components, and industrial supplies.
4.2 Analysis
4.2.1 Baseline model
The maximum likelihood method implemented in LISREL 8 (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1996) has
been used to estimate the model parameters. Starting with the cross-sectional baseline model (4),
the overall fit measures (see Table 1) show that the fit to the annual data in the different samples is
extremely bad (in addition to the highly significant 2c  statistic the fit index RMSEA is
considerably above the cut-off value of .05 (Browne and Cudeck, 1993;  Hu and Bentler, 1999) and
both CFI and TLI  are far below the threshold value of .95 (Hu and Bentler, 1998); for an overview
of the interpretation of fit indices in structural equation modelling see for example Bagozzi and
Baumgartner, 1994). Strictly speaking, this renders any interpretation of the model parameters
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meaningless. For comparisons with subsequent models controlling for unobservable variables we
will nevertheless shortly discuss the estimated effects of product quality. In all samples the direct
effect of product quality on market share is positive. Since market share increases ROI both directly
and indirectly (via reducing relative direct cost) the positive direct impact of quality on profitability
is further increased by this indirect effect. The positive effect is partly offset by higher direct cost
accompanying higher product quality for SBUs operating in the capital goods industry. Overall,
these findings closely mirror the results of preceding cross-sectional studies on how quality
influences profitability (e.g., Phillips, Chang, and Buzzell, 1983).
Parameter Industrial
Goods
Capital
Goods
Consumer
Goods
QUAROI ,g .239***(.015)
.097***
(.023)
.084***
(.020)
QUAMS ,g .231***(.010)
.135***
(.019)
.217***
(.013)
QUACOST ,g .001(.005)
.030***
(.008)
.006
(.006)
MSROI ,b .274***(.024)
.212***
(.037)
.491***
(.033)
MSCOST ,b -.052***(.008)
-.116***
(.013)
-.075***
(.009)
COSTROI ,b -.401***(.052)
-.632***
(.084)
-.532***
(.081)
Fit
Measures
2
.).( fdc 19,315(270) 5,538(270) 10,137(270)
RMSEA .333 .320 .336
RMSEAp .000 .000 .000
CFI .290 .312 .300
NFI .287 .302 .295
RMRs .311 .331 .332
Standard errors are in parentheses;
05.**  ,01.*** ££ pp
Table 1: Parameter estimates and fit measures for the baseline model BM
4.2.2 Controlling for time-invariant effects
As a first step in investigating the role unobservable/unobserved variables play in the relationships
between the observed variables in our model we control for time-invariant effects. Because we
would like to test the assumption that perceived product quality is correlated with these unobserved
effects, we first estimate a random-effects model RE under the assumption that the individual ef-
fects ROIm , MSm  and COSTm  are correlated with each other but not with quality.
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Compared to the baseline model the overall fit (see Table 2) has considerably improved, a clear
indication that unobserved individual effects exist. Nevertheless, the fit measures indicate that the
model is still clearly rejected by the data.
Parameter Industrial
Goods
Capital
Goods
Consumer
Goods
QUAROI ,g .162***(.020)
.060**
(.030)
.094***
(.026)
QUAMS ,g .069***(.006)
.088***
(.011)
.055***
(.007)
QUACOST ,g -.023***(.004)
-.001
(.007)
-.036***
(.006)
MSROI ,b .472***(.071)
.528***
(.110)
.638***
(.103)
MSCOST ,b -.031***(.012)
-.005
(.023)
-.046**
(.020)
COSTROI ,b -.425***(.108)
-.681***
(.155)
-.873***
(.128)
Fit
Measures
2
.).( fdc 4,445(264) 1,465(264) 2,197(264)
RMSEA .169 .161 .166
RMSEAp .000 .000 .000
CFI .844 .843 .863
NFI .836 .815 .847
RMRs .113 .069 .117
Standard errors are in parentheses;
05.**  ,01.***
££
pp
Table 2: Parameter estimates and fit measures for the RE model
To control for a possible correlation between product quality and the time-invariant unobserved
effects we estimated two different specifications – the RECEV and the FD model. Although some
of the fit indices for these models (see Table 3) reach levels indicating at least a moderate fit
(RMSEA for the FD model and sRMR  for the RECEV model), overall these static models again
do not seem to provide an adequate representation of the system under study.
To test whether time-invariant effects simultaneously influence both product quality and the en-
dogenous variables in the model, we performed several 2c  difference tests (see Table 4). An over-
all test results from a comparison between the RE and the RECEV model. Restricting all parame-
ters of the reduced form equations for the individual effects in the RECEV model to zero leads to a
significant drop in fit for industrial and consumer goods. Whereas product quality seems to be cor-
related with the persistent effects in these industries, this does not hold true for capital goods. Be-
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sides an overall test, each possible correlation between quality and the different time-invariant ef-
fects has been tested individually by restricting the RECEV model appropriately. With one excep-
tion product quality is correlated with the unobserved effects in the industry and consumer goods
samples (quality is not related to ROIm  for consumer goods). A completely different picture
emerges for capital goods. Surprisingly, quality is not correlated with any of the individual effects
in this type of business.
Industrial
Goods
Capital
Goods
Consumer
Goods
Parameter RECEV FD RECEV FD RECEV FD
QUAROI ,g .108***(.026)
.102***
(.031)
.051
(.038)
.024
(.045)
.116***
(.032)
.089**
(.038)
QUAMS ,g .057***(.007)
.027***
(.007)
.084***
(.011)
.072***
(.013)
.046***
(.008)
.032***
(.008)
QUACOST ,g -.026***(.004)
-.021***
(.005)
-.005
(.008)
-.003
(.008)
-.046***
(.006)
-.043***
(.007)
MSROI ,b .466***(.071)
.590***
(.082)
.528***
(.110)
.672***
(.112)
.640***
(.103)
.801***
(.114)
MSCOST ,b -.031***(.012)
-.020
(.012)
-.005
(.023)
-.001
(.019)
-.047**
(.020)
-.031
(.020)
COSTROI ,b -.429***(.108)
-.442***
(.121)
-.682***
(.155)
-.583***
(.179)
-.869***
(.128)
-.711***
(.144)
Fit
measures
2
c
4,372 604 1,461 421 2,150 419
d.f. 261 183 261 183 261 183
RMSEA .169 .063 .162 .076 .166 .064
RMSEAp .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .003
CFI .847 .216 .843 .277 .866 .342
NFI .839 .169 .816 .189 .851 .236
RMRs .040 .076 .059 .108 .043 .089
Standard errors are in parentheses; 05.**  ,01.***
££
pp
Table 3: Parameter estimates and fit measures for the RECEV and FD model
In comparison to the baseline model, the most striking result of the RECEV/FD specifications is a
reversal in sign for the quality-cost link. Quality seems to have a significant negative influence on
direct cost for the industrial and consumer goods once unobserved individual effects are taken into
account. However, in contrast to this substantial interpretation this finding has elsewhere been de-
scribed as merely an artifact which results from the measurement procedure for product quality in
the PIMS project (Boulding, 1992; Boulding and Staelin, 1993). Overall, the direct effects of prod-
uct quality on ROI and MS are lower, except for the impact on ROI in the consumer goods indus-
try. Therefore, it can be concluded that time-invariant unobservable effects increase ROI, market
share and also direct cost for business units offering products with superior product quality.
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Competing models 2
c
d.f. 2
c
D
d.f.D p
Industrial Goods
RECEV 4372.25 261 - - -
RECEV\ ( )QUAROI -m 4377.65 262 5.40 1 .020
RECEV\ ( )QUAMS -m 4427.57 262 55.32 1 .000
RECEV\ ( )QUACOST -m 4376.63 262 4.38 1 .036
RE 4444.99 264 72.74 3 .000
Capital Goods
RECEV 1461.33 261 - - -
RECEV\ ( )QUAROI -m 1461.34 262 .01 1 .920
RECEV\ ( )QUAMS -m 1462.80 262 1.47 1 .225
RECEV\ ( )QUACOST -m 1462.50 262 1.17 1 .279
RE 1465.03 264 3.70 3 .296
Consumer Goods
RECEV 2149.56 261 - - -
RECEV\ ( )QUAROI -m 2151.46 262 1.90 1 .168
RECEV\ ( )QUAMS -m 2179.90 262 30.34 1 .000
RECEV\ ( )QUACOST -m 2162.10 262 12.54 1 .000
RE 2197.06 264 47.50 3 .000
Table 4: 2c  difference tests for uncorrelatedness between product quality and time-invari-
ant unobservables
If a static model with time-invariant individual effects were an adequate representation of the qual-
ity impact on profitability, one would expect that both the RECEV and the FD model would pro-
duce similar estimates. However, there are some noticeable differences between the parameters of
both models, especially with respect to the market share effect on direct costs. Whereas in the
RECEV model this effect remains significant except for capital goods businesses, in the FD model
it vanishes completely in all three samples. Because differencing the data to a certain extent already
eliminates the bias caused by autocorrelated unobservable variables (this effect increases the higher
the autocorrelation), this might be a reasonable explanation for this effect. In a final step, we there-
fore control for both time-invariant and autocorrelated unobserved effects.
4.2.3 Controlling for autoregressive effects
Judged by conventional cutoff values in structural equation modelling (e.g., Hu and Bentler, 1999),
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the overall fit for the unconstrained estimation of the ARDL model (7) is quite good (see Table 5).
However, the hypothesis that the influence of unobservable variables is properly captured solely by
a serial correlation model is challenged by these results. Already a closer inspection shows that the
estimated coefficients for the lagged explanatory variables in part differ noticeably from their theo-
retical values which are derived from the restrictions of the serial correlation model (see the calcu-
lated values in Table 5). For example, the calculated effects of lagged quality on market share
(
1, -QUAMSg ) are several times bigger (in absolute values) than the estimated parameters (e.g., -.028
vs. -.004 in the consumer goods sample) and for capital goods the coefficient, albeit not significant,
has even the “wrong” sign (.009 instead of -.042). Likewise, the parameter for lagged market share
in the cost equation (
1, -MSCOST
g ) is significantly positive for industrial goods (.033), whereas the
serial correlation model predicts a negative coefficient (-.011).
Because a mere comparison between estimated and theoretical values does not allow a final judge-
ment of the adequacy of a serial correlation model, we performed statistical tests based on the 2c
differences between the unrestricted ARDL model (7) and various restricted models. As one might
expect given the findings above, a reestimation of the ARDL model under the complete set of non-
linear restrictions imposed by a serial correlation specification (AR1-RECEV model) led to a sig-
nificant decrease in fit ( 05.=a ) for all samples (see Table 6). In addition, the hypothesis of a serial
correlation model has been tested separately for each endogenous variable. The results varied con-
siderably for the three samples and will now be discussed in some detail with respect to the quality
effect on ROI and market share (for direct cost there is almost no change in the parameter estimates
compared to the RECEV model).
With respect to ROI, the serial correlation model holds for SBUs operating in the industrial goods
and the capital goods industry but not for consumer goods (see the tests for AR1-RECEV ROI  in
Table 6). From a substantial point of view, controlling for serially correlated effects in addition to
time-invariant unobservables in the former industries only marginally alters the results for the di-
rect effect of product quality on profitability (see Tables 3 and 5).
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Industrial
Goods
Capital
Goods
Consumer
Goods
Parameter acalc.
val.
calc.
val.
calc.
val.
QUAROI ,g .115***(.038)
.024
(.053)
.035
(.044)
1,
-
QUAROIg -.026(.040)
-.078 .073
(.056)
-.015 .014
(.046)
-.019
QUAMS ,g .018**(.009)
.066***
(.015)
.037***
(.010)
1,
-
QUAMSg -.007(.010)
-.017 .009
(.017)
-.042 -.004
(.011)
-.028
QUACOST ,g -.027***(.006)
-.005
(.010)
-.051***
(.008)
1,
-
QUACOSTg .013**(.006)
.027 -.003
(.011)
.005 .029***
(.009)
.046
MSROI ,b .662***(.098)
.635***
(.135)
.709***
(.132)
1,
-
MSROIb -.596***(.100)
-.451 -.507***
(.131)
-.391 -.618***
(.129)
-.376
MSCOST ,b .011(.016)
.014
(.026)
-.020
(.025)
1,
-
MSCOSTb .033**(.015)
-.011 .016
(.024)
-.014 .024
(.024)
.018
COSTROI ,b -.431***(.144)
-.549***
(.210)
-.799***
(.164)
1,
-
COSTROIb .343**(.144)
.294 .163
(.212)
.338 .088
(.166)
.423
ROIr .681*** .616*** .530***
MSr .964*** .640*** .755***
COSTr .988*** .969*** .897***
Fit
measures
2
.).( fdc 530(204) 422(204) 448(204)
RMSEA .052 .067 .061
90% CIRMSEA .046 - .057 .056 - .078 .054 - .069
RMSEAp .295 .006 .009
CFI .988 .972 .983
NFI .980 .947 .969
RMRs .027 .035 .026
Standard errors are in parentheses; 05.**  ,01.*** ££ pp
aValues are calculated based on the restrictions rgg
-=
-
1  and
r bb
-=
-
1  of the autocorrelation model
Table 5: Parameter estimates and fit measures for the unrestricted ARDL model
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Competing models 2
c
d.f. 2
c
D
d.f.D p
Industrial Goods
unconstr. ARDL 530.11 204 - - -
AR1-RECEV 554.21 210 24.10 6 .001
AR1-RECEV ROI 535.90 207 5.79 3 .122
AR1-RECEV COST 546.65 206 16.54 2 .000
AR1-RECEV MS 531.63 205 1.52 1 .218
Capital Goods
unconstr. ARDL 421.70 204 - - -
AR1-RECEV 444.69 210 22.99 6 .001
AR1-RECEV ROI 426.81 207 5.11 3 .164
AR1-RECEV COST 423.05 206 1.35 2 .509
AR1-RECEV MS 438.13 205 16.43 1 .000
Consumer Goods
unconstr. ARDL 448.14 204 - - -
AR1-RECEV 471.07 210 22.93 6 .001
AR1-RECEV ROI 458.77 207 10.63 3 .014
AR1-RECEV COST 452.95 206 4.81 2 .090
AR1-RECEV MS 455.65 205 7.51 1 .006
Table 6: 2c  difference tests for the serial correlation hypothesis
For consumer goods instead, the changes are rather dramatically. Whereas time-invariant variables
seem to decrease profitability for high-quality businesses (compare the results for the BM and the
RECEV model in Tables 1 and 3), autocorrelated unobservables seem to greatly increase ROI,
which leads to a quality effect which is indistinguishably different from zero once these effects are
controlled. However, it should be pointed out that the serial correlation model was rejected for con-
sumer goods, so that the interpretation (e.g., serial correlation vs. state dependence) of the autocor-
relation coefficient for ROI remains ambiguous.
Except for industrial goods, the serial correlation hypothesis is rejected for the dependent variable
market share (see the tests for AR1-RECEV MS  in Table 6). Since all coefficients for lagged quality
are not significant, these results instead give support for the state dependence model. The role un-
observable variables play in the relationship between quality and market share is obviously quite
different from that in the profitability equation. The impact which product quality has on market
share seems to be mediated by its influence on unobservable variables which might be subsumed
under the notion “goodwill”. However, it should be mentioned that these results are equally con-
formable with alternative models, for example a Koyck specification, which do not invoke the ex-
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istence of unobservable variables (Jacobson, 1990). Using the estimates for the current effect of
product quality and the autoregressive coefficient for market share (see Table 5), the total effect of
product quality on market share ( )(
,
T
QUAMSg ) can be approximated by the long-run multiplier
( )1/(
,
)(
, MSQUAMS
T
QUAMS rgg -= ). This leads to a total quality effect of .183 for capital goods and .151
for consumer goods, values relatively close to those of the baseline model, which represents the
long-run relations between strategic factors and business performance.
4.3 Conclusion
In strategy research meanwhile some consensus exists that controlling for unobservable, firm-spe-
cific effects is of great relevance for empirical research on key success factors. Besides determining
the “causal”, typically short-term effects of these strategic factors, observing the influence of unob-
servable variables can provide important insides into the processes which lead to observed long-
term relationships between strategic factors and business performance.
In this study, we propose a structural equation approach to control for time-invariant and autocor-
related unobservable variables based on panel data. Gradually extending a cross-sectional simulta-
neous equation model on the direct and indirect effects of product quality on profitability allows us
to gauge how these different types of unobservables influence the relations in the model. We re-
frained from also controlling for transitory stochastic effects for several reasons. First of all, sto-
chastic shocks, whose influence last only one period, seem relevant at most when the short-term
“causal” effect of strategic factors is of interest, whereas we focused on the effects unobservable
variables have on the long-term relationships between product quality, market share and ROI. This
view is also supported by empirical evidence. As Ailawadi, Farris, and Parry (1999) have shown,
controlling exclusively for temporary stochastic shocks only marginally alters the estimated impact
of market share on the different components of ROI compared to a cross-sectional regression.
Second, even if one is interested in the short-term effect of strategic factors, the use of lagged val-
ues as instruments in an IV estimation of a first-difference model like equation (3) might lead to
some methodological problems. Ideally, the instruments should be uncorrelated with the distur-
bances but highly correlated with the explanatory variables. Although the autocorrelations for data
in levels is very high for many PIMS variables (e.g., market share, relative direct cost, product
quality), this is not true for the time series of first differences. Likewise, also the correlation be-
tween first differences and lagged levels is rather low. For example, for a time series of market
share from the PIMS SPIYR data base covering a period of six years ( 1141=n ), we found correla-
tions between first differences and levels lagged two and three periods in the range of -.033 and -
.152. Under such conditions IV estimates might be seriously biased and highly imprecise (e.g.,
Bound, Jaeger, and Baker, 1995; Staiger and Stock, 1997).
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For an empirical application of our methodology we used data from the PIMS annual data base.
Although it has to be taken into account that the number of variables in our model is rather limited,
it can be concluded from the results that perceived product quality and market share, long empha-
sized by PIMS advocates as important drivers of profitability (Buzzell and Gale, 1987), remain
relevant even if the influence of time-invariant and autoregressive firm-specific effects is con-
trolled. For the three types of industries which were analyzed, quality drives ROI by increasing
market share which in turn has a positive direct effect on profitability. Only for industrial goods the
direct effect of product quality on profitability is still positive, an indication that customers are
willing to pay a price premium for higher quality in this industry. To further explore how product
quality is linked with higher profitability in the cross-sectional models, a component level analysis
should be performed (Farris, Parry, and Ailawadi, 1992).
An interesting result of our study concerns the relationship between product quality and market
share. Whereas typically the control of autocorrelated unobservables has been identified with the
serial correlation model, the empirical results for the market share equation more favour the state
dependence hypothesis. Thus, unobservable variables like “goodwill” are positively influenced by
product quality which in turn improves the market share position.
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